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Abstract 
This paper analyses the social structure of the government debt market in Spain from a social 
network analysis approach. The relational analysis has been limited to the case of the syndicate 
issuances that took place between 2002 and 2015 and the process whereby lead manager 
banks choose their partners to underwrite the issue. The main contribution of this paper is the 
identification of social tie patterns between market participants and their structural equivalence 
in the market. Furthermore, it reveals how status operates in the market, conferring advantages 
on those actors with optimum positioning.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic sociology has been long interested in the problem of what Granovetter (1985) called 
the “embeddedness of markets”. During the seventies and eighties, various scholars have 
demonstrated that economic actions are embedded within networks and in concrete and 
ongoing systems of social relations (White, 1981). Similarly, social structure is conceptualized as 
a series of social relationship networks; a set of regular interactions among individuals or social 
groups that form a particular market structure in which the notion of status constitutes a central 
element.  Status can be defined as a position within a social structure that confers prestige and 
privileges upon an actor according to ascribed and achieved criteria. Actors’ position in this 
hierarchy affects others’ perceptions and actions towards them and thereby the opportunities 
and constraints they face in the market (Jensen 2008; Jensen and Roy 2008; Podolny 1994).  
The objective of this paper is to examine the status hierarchy of market makers in the 
Spanish public debt market. More specifically, this paper analyses the process whereby market 
participants collaborate in syndicate bond issuances and the consequent emergence of a 
particular structure of influence and prestige positions that are consistent and stable over time. 
Syndicated public debt issues are specific formulae to sell public debt in the market and an 
alternative to ordinary Treasury auctions. In the case of syndicated issuances the Treasury 
issues a new bond and in order to sell it, hires a small group of investment banks that receive 
direct instructions from investors wishing to acquire Spanish debt. In addition to this select 
group, other banks are involved as co-leaders. They are selected by the former in order to 
underwrite the entire issuance. In the light of recent difficulties experienced by the governments 
of Spain and other peripheral Eurozone countries to access market financing under 
economically sustainable conditions, syndicate issuances are playing an increasingly important 
role in financing the government deficit, thereby generating public debt.  Our analysis identifies 
the social structure and the sequential aspects of this type of bond issuance that is highly 
significant in terms of the monetary amount auctioned.  
The article offers a comprehensive analysis of the Spanish public debt market structure 
and public debt ownership within world financial sector. It provides crucial yet hitherto 
unavailable evidence for relational data about status positions of financial corporations in the 
public debt market, and its relations with the ownership structure of the public debt. In analysing 
the social status of the Spanish public debt market we are reconsidering Marx’s notion of a 
financial aristocracy (1994 [1867]), which in this case refers firstly to a number of financial 
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institutions that dominate access to and the conditions under which the State accesses market 
financing and secondly to the steadily growing concentration of government debt ownership 
among a small number of creditors. In contrast to more recent studies into government debt 
markets (see Hager, 2015; Lemoine, 2013), this article provides a breakdown of the details of 
the participants in this market and public debt security holders.   
The accumulation of government debt in OECD member countries has acquired an 
unprecedented significance in the social, economic and political spheres of advanced capitalist 
societies. Indeed, the concept of the ‘debt state’ reflects a process characterised by the steady 
rise in government debt, that began in the 1980s in all rich capitalist democracies. This situation 
requires a review of the micro-mechanisms employed by states in order to finance their deficit, 
as posited in this article.   
The case studied in this article is relevant for the following reasons. Firstly, Spain’s 
government debt market follows a pattern that in general terms is similar to other European 
countries, the result of process of convergence in operations and the types of securities 
exchanged (Blanco Garía, 2015). Specifically, the syndicated process shares similar patterns in 
Europe and the rest of the world (Lemoine, 2013; Francke et al., 2012; Podolny). It can therefore 
be claimed that the case under study is representative of all European countries. Nevertheless, 
and drawing on MacKenzie (2009), there is a need for comparative studies that highlight the 
diverse nature of government debt market institutional and technological structures and their 
impact on state financing systems. A further aspect for consideration, as explained later, is that 
government debt markets have varying degrees of financialization depending on the nature of 
actors participating therein and the breakdown of their micro-structure.  (Hardie, 2011).  
Secondly, the relevance of the case under study also stems from its innovative nature 
and the lack of research carried out in the fields of Sociology, Political Science and Law into 
government debt market micro-structures that shed light on the participating nodes and the way 
their relationships are structured. In this sense, we believe that this paper can contribute to 
revealing the suitability of social network analysis as a means of assessing syndicated issuance 
mechanisms, which, although they remain relatively scarce -despite the key contributions of 
Podolny (1993, 1994); Baum et al (2005) or Li and Rowley (2002)-, offer an insight into the 
relational patterns of influence and prestige shown by financial institutions on public debt 
markets, as well as financial markets in general.   
 Thirdly, identifying a social structure for the government debt market, defined as the 
presence of regular patterns in relationship (Wasserman & Faust, 1997), and its impact on the 
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par amount acquired by each actor, provides a description of how the market works, moving 
beyond the principles of neoclassical theory and its efficiency model. Indeed, the article 
describes a market segmented by status positions that allows for the comparative advantage of 
the most favourably positioned actors in terms of access to debt in conditions that are clearly 
more beneficial.    
The main thesis of this article is that the issuance network models the advantages of the 
key participating actors in accordance with their structural social position. More specifically, we 
have examined two hypotheses that operationalise the so-called Mathew Effect (Merton, 1968), 
whereby actors with higher status obtain greater recognition and reward for performing a given 
task, whilst lower-status actors received correspondingly less.  
The remaining of this paper is organized into six sections. Section two offers a general 
theoretical framework for status in markets and financialisation of public debt markets. A specific 
analysis of the mechanisms of syndicate issue and a presentation of the case is introduced in 
section three. Section four introduces the methodological design used to undertake a 
longitudinal analysis of status positions in financial markets from a relational viewpoint, using 
Pajek software. This is followed by the calculation of the various status measures to prove the 
convergence of the results and the validity of our hypotheses. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the major findings and directions for future research.  
2. Theory and hypothesis 
2.1. The notion of status under discussion  
Status is a central concept in social stratification theory. According to Weber (1987), status 
denotes the relative position of an actor in a publicly recognized hierarchy of social worth. 
Parsons (1951) went on to define the concept of “status-role” as a position within a social 
structure that confers prestige and privileges according to ascribed and achieved criteria.  
This article considers a relational conception of status applied to the understanding of 
financial markets performance. Likewise, and as shown below, the article is based on a 
conceptualisation of markets as social structural patterns that emerge from the embedded 
interaction of social actors (Baker, 1984). The idea of markets as roles’ structures was 
introduced by White (1981) in the eighties. Swedberg (2005) considers White’s research on 
markets (White, 2002) to represent a bold attempt to create a totally new and totally sociological 
theory of markets based on the notion that markets are embedded in social networks. In his 
most recent work on markets, White (2002) explains how particular market structures or spaces 
emerge. He posits that the way market actors manage uncertainty produces a role structure, 
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shaped and formed by extensive mathematical modelling.  Baker’s (1984) research on the stock 
options market in the 1980s can be considered another important and early network study of 
markets. In his view, markets may be seen as social rather than exclusively economic 
structures, with demonstrable effects on the determination of prices.  
More recently, Podolny (1993) introduced the analytical concept of status order to name 
the macro level view of markets as regular patterns of interlinkages between producers, 
consumers and third parties. Actors’ positions in this hierarchy affect the perceptions and actions 
of others towards them and therefore the opportunities and constraints they face in the market 
(Jensen 2008; Jensen and Roy 2008; Podolny 1994). These definitions highlight that the 
concept of status is not a static attribute of an actor insofar that it denotes a producer’s position 
in relation to its competitors.  The relational character of status means that it is formed in 
accordance with the network of relationships between market participants.  
Status is valuable in markets because it functions as a signal of quality, influencing not 
only how firms are perceived but also the activities they engage in, and the decision to 
collaborate with other firms (Podolny, 1993). Defining status as perceived quality means that it 
functions as a signal based on the perception others hold of an actor’s current and past 
performance. However, Jensen and Roy (2008) introduced the difference between status and 
reputation, arguing that the former is the prestige accorded actors because of their social 
positions and the latter, the prestige accorded them based on their previous performance.  
Status influences an extensive range of market outcomes, as Sauder et al (2012) 
insightfully showed in their review of the current state of the field. These include market 
segmentation (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001; Podolny 2001), price formation (Baker, 1984; 
Podolny, 1993), the formation and dissolution of exchange ties (Podolny, 1994, White, 2002), or 
exchange partner choices (Jensen and Roy, 2008; Granados and Knoke, 2013; Baum et al, 
2005).  
Whilst the concept of status tied to market social structure has been amply developed by  
Network Analysis, mention must also be made of Bourdieu and Fligstein’s contributions to 
economic sociology regarding markets as fields – namely    as a structure of actual and potential 
relations (Bourdieu, 1997, 2000). In the opinion of Bourdieu, each field is defined in accordance 
with its own logic and interest, conditioned by the appropriation and distribution processes of 
varying types of economic, cultural or symbolic capital among the various actors.   Like Bourdieu 
and Weber, Fligstein (2001) emphasizes the role of struggles in the market. He posits that social 
structure of a field is a cultural construction that enables dominant firms to develop tactics and 
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strategies that reproduce their position over challenger firms. Fligstein considers that the social 
structures of markets are « fundamentally systems of power » (2001: 69). These systems are 
grounded on a structure of understandings about what makes one set of organizations 
dominant. These cultural and cognitive frames are intrinsically dimensions of the structured 
exchange between market participants.  
Whilst Bourdieu explicitly distanced himself from the stances adopted by  Mark 
Granovetter and Harrison White, claiming that both authors failed to consider the impact of 
structure on economic action (Bourdieu, 2005), we believe that the conceptualisation of the 
market as a network of structurally unequal positions in terms of access to information, does 
indeed shed light on the way power relation patterns between actors emerge, shape themselves 
and materialise. Similarly, and in line with  Mackenzie (1988), we believe that the analysis of 
social networks prevents the anonymization of markets and structures that are separate from the 
nodes that form them and the relations between them.    
In the light of the previous contributions, status can be considered a function of market 
structure and market participants.  
Firstly, investor characteristics are important criteria that explain ascribed and achieved 
status. Attributes such as experience and prior performance (Li and Rowley, 2002), nationality or 
market share aspirations (Baum et al, 2005) have been considered important factors in 
explaining partner choices by investment banks in underwriting syndicate issuances, in scholarly 
literature. The extent to which nationality, seen as an attribute of financial institutions,  can 
explain status positions in the government debt market, is an interesting issue, as the market is 
closely interlocked with State interests and therefore supposedly with the countries’ financial 
elite (Lemoine, 2013). However, recent analyses of  interlocking directorates in Spain (De 
Andrés, 2014; Cárdenas, 2012; Sicilia & Sallan, 2008) reveal a loss of centrality by national 
banks in favour of non-financial companies, partly attributable to the internalisation of the 
Spanish banking system and the globalisation that has led to an influx of foreign capital, with the 
consequent reduction in the weight and influence of traditional groups in the Spanish network. 
Analysing the extent to which this trend is echoed in the government debt market is therefor of 
major interest.   
Secondly, as Fligstein pointed out, the institutionalization of a particular exchange model 
is produced through the creation and reproduction of a set of written and non-written regulations 
of cooperation and competition in the market, specific agreements among actors, strategies of 
competition or cooperation and actors’ local knowledge regarding the way markets operate.  
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The specificity of the market we are dealing with lies in the close cooperation between 
the Treasury and private banks (Lemoine, 2013). It is precisely through this cooperation that the 
public debt market is structured in regulatory terms by the financial and political elites.  Under 
the imperative of liquidity (Carruters and Stinchcombe, 1999) those elites have built up a 
regulation that favours, explicitly, albeit not transparently, those banking entities that are 
considered to be strategic due to their activity in the government debt market, or due to their 
capacity to spread Spanish government debt securities to secondary markets and foreign 
investors.  
Most studies on status have shown the mechanisms whereby status positions confer 
advantages for markets (see Jensen, 2008; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Sauder et al., 2012) 
and constraints on actors’ behaviour (Phillips  and Zuckerman, 2001). In this respect, status can 
be considered a position shaped and built by the reproduction of the Mathew Effect, a dynamic 
of broad interest within Sociology (Sauder et al., 2012). According to Correll et al (2011), the first 
step of the Mathew Effect consists of a socially endogenous inference whereby high-status 
actors are evaluated and thus rewarded more positively than lower status actors for a given 
contribution. Similarly, a socially endogenous investment process occurs, transforming 
recognition into resources that encourage market participants to become involved in higher 
quality operations and therefore boost their status. Indeed, the applicability of the Matthew Effect 
to the analysis of the government debt market reveals the reproduction of the virtuous circle 
whereby the most advantageously positioned financial institutions, namely market markers, can 
obtain further benefit merely by participating in this type of issuances, receiving large 
commissions paid by the Treasury and participating in the most important operations in terms of 
the amount borrowed in the market. 
2.2. Hypothesis 
In the light of the contributions above mentioned, hypothesis one of this article (H.1) refers to an 
emerging market structure shaped by the regular patterns of interactions among market makers. 
According to Dass, Reddy and Iacobucci (2014), interactions between Government, underwriter 
leaders and co-leaders reveal a pattern of status positions that shape a network structure of 
prestige and influence. As a result, a particular market structure emerges, determined by the 
dynamics of the partner choice process, the role played by the actors, and its frequency. The 
resulting status positions confer advantages to those actors better positioned in the networks. As 
a result, a relational pattern based on the amount of the investors’ accumulated public debt 
securities is likely to emerge, following the Mathew Effect whereby actors with a higher status 
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obtain greater rewards whilst lower status actors received correspondingly fewer. We thus 
hypothesize that: 
H.1 Status positions, shaped by the regular patterns of interactions among market markers, are 
strongly associated with the amount of bonds held by the various actors.  
Secondly, and closely linked to the previous hypothesis, the status structure of the 
government debt market may be linked to attributive elements such as the nationality of financial 
institutions, which in turn can be associated with certain advantages in this market, such as the 
choice of exchange partners, or the amount of bonds held by each of the participating actors.   
The presence of foreign investors is considered a relevant indicator of government debt 
market financialisation. Existing studies (Andritzky, 2012) have provided evidence for the 
relationship between the investor base and yields, which suggests that an increase in the share 
of securities held by non-residents is associated with a decline in yields, but an increase in the 
level and volatility of yields. 
The number of foreign market markers in the Spanish government debt securities market 
stands at 50% of the total. This percentage is significantly high, particularly considering that 
although the share of non-resident holdings has increased sharply during the last decade in all 
G-20 countries with the exception of Canada and Japan, this trend slowed down in 2007, and 
was even reversed in the case of the southern European countries (Andritzky, 2012). 
In addition to these issues we argue that the government debt market is not 
geographically segmented, showing the weakness of national boundaries when it comes to 
considering the investment strategies of financial corporations and the globalization of 
financialised public debt markets. Therefore we expect that: 
 H.2. Government debt market will be weakly structured in terms of national origin of 
financial corporations showing the globalized nature of financial relations. 
3. Presentation and contextualisation of the cases studied  
This section introduces the research case within a broader contextualization referred to the main 
transformations affecting the European public debt markets. This is followed by a presentation of 
the mechanisms of syndicate issuances from which the data for this study were obtained, and 
the general characteristics of market participants. Both are key elements in understanding how 
market participants interact with one another in a collaborative network that allocates status 
positions involving differential access to material and symbolic rewards.  
3.1. Public debt markets in Europe: financialisation and sovereign debt crisis.  
As will be seen below, the analysis of the social structure of the government debt market in 
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Spain requires a brief insight into the institutional, technological and regulatory framework of 
government debt in Europe and its most recent developments, marked by processes of financial 
deregulation and innovation. Although a comparison of the institutional structure of government 
debt markets goes beyond the objectives of this article, a series of general characteristics and 
change processes that fall within the umbrella term of financialisation must be addressed  (see 
van de Zwan, 2014).   
Financialisation is the concept used to define the increasingly significant role played by 
financial systems in contemporary societies. It is understood here as a profit growth strategy 
developed by financial corporations from the 1970s onwards in core capitalist economies. This 
strategy drives and is driven by complex change processes such as deregulation, globalization 
and financial innovation (Engelen, 2008). At the centre of this strategy lies risk management, a 
central tool for the financial industry, and an essential instrument in order to generate business 
opportunities. For operational purposes, financialisation will be defined following Hardie’s (2011) 
approach ‘as the ability to trade risk; both taking and trading the risk on the performance of an 
asset’ (143). The breadth and depth of financialisation depends on the characteristics of national 
market structures, the financial instruments traded in that market and the type of investors that 
participate in it. 
In the case of government debt markets, financialisation has to do with an intense 
process of deregulation and financial innovation that began in the 1980s in most European 
countries.  The financialisation of government debt markets depends on the legal restriction 
related to borrowing and short selling2, and on the existence of a variety of authorized 
transactions ensuring liquidity and reducing credit risks  
The recent sovereign debt crisis suffered by southern European countries, especially 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, is attributable mainly to the institutional and technological 
structure of these markets, which  enabled investors to speculate with different types of 
sovereign risks. Evidently, the banking crisis of 2007, together with a set of structural internal 
imbalances affecting the components of public deficit and external debt, explains the 
progressive rise of public debt since 2008. However, these alone cannot explain the worsening 
of the borrowing conditions imposed by markets, between 2011 and 2012, when in the case of 
Spain, the sovereign spread, measured by the difference between the yield of 10-year Spanish 
bonds and 10-year German bonds, stood at 637 basic points (see Massó, 2016).  
                                                            
2 Short selling is the sale of a security that is not owned by the seller, or that the seller has borrowed. 
Short selling is motivated by the belief that a security’s price will decline, enabling it to be bought back at a 
lower price to make a profit. Short selling may be prompted by speculation, or by the desire to hedge the 
downside risk of a long position in the same security or a related one. 
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The financialisation of the Spanish government’s debt market structure is linked to a 
variety of properties which can be defined from a series of features such as high trade density, a 
predominance of repo transactions, a high volume of sovereign CDS trading, and a debt 
composition characterised by a high rate of non-resident debt holders and market makers. This 
type of structure has been designed to favour market liquidity, a constant concern for the 
Spanish government due to its structural deficit problems.  However, in a context of economic 
uncertainty, these properties can also worsen borrowing conditions, as trading sovereign risk 
offers attractive business opportunities, resulting in increased volatility and undermining debt 
sustainability.  
 The analysis put forward in this article must be seen within the context of this general 
framework. As stated above, the aim is to examine the emerging social structure of the 
government debt market, using data obtained from a specific debt issuance mechanism, namely 
syndicate issuance. 
3.2. Syndicate issuance: general features 
Syndicate issuance is an alternative and extraordinary government mechanism for issuing debt. 
It consists of a bond auction whereby a temporary group of investment banks and broker-dealers 
is brought together to acquire the entire issuance at an agreed price. The underwriter syndicate 
is formed by a group of syndicate leader managers that are responsible for organizing, 
managing, subscribing and distributing (‘placing’) the bond in the secondary market.  The leader 
managers choose the rest of the syndicate co-managers’ group members. These financial 
institutions assume the risk of buying the entire new security issues and reselling them to 
investors. 
An underwriter syndicate is usually formed when an issue is too large for a single firm to 
handle. The syndicate is compensated by the underwriting spread, which is the difference 
between the price paid to the issuer and the price received from investors and other broker-
dealers.    
Despite the growing relevance of this financing mechanism, there is no specific 
regulatory procedure that dictates when the State may apply said mechanism, the specific 
requirements the debt underwriters must comply with, or the value of the commissions payable 
by the State to each in exchange for selling the entire issuance. The existence of confidentiality 
clauses forces financial institutions to guarantee the privacy of the entire process and prevents 
the publication of these data.   
 As for the market participants in syndicate issuances, they are chosen from the group of 
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most active market makers. They are a group of financial companies whose ultimate objective is 
to boost the liquidity of the secondary public debt market and cooperate with the General 
Secretariat of the Treasury and Financial Policy in the diffusion of Government Debt 
domestically and abroad. 
As shown in Figure 1, an initial distinction can be drawn between market members 
(account holders) and non-members (third parties).  Account holders are financial institutions 
authorised to acquire and hold book-entry registered public debt in accounts opened on their 
own behalf in the Book-Entry System. The account holders include Management Institutions, 
which manage the accounts of participants that are not authorised to operate directly through 
the Book-Entry System. For these purposes, they hold a global account in the Book-Entry 
System, which covers those accounts exactly at all times and are known as third party accounts. 
  
Figure 1. Government debt market actors 
 
Source: author’s own 
 
Following Carruthers and Stinchcombe (1999), the existence of market makers is one of 
the conditions for liquidity, together with continuous auctions in which a number of 
knowledgeable buyers meet a number of knowledgeable sellers, and the homogenization and 
standardization of commodities. Market makers help to conduct continuous auctions by abiding 
by the norm of participating in all public debt issues in a more favourable or unfavourable 
conditions.  
In the case of the Spanish public debt market, the figure of the market maker is relatively 
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recent, dating back to 1999. According to the Treasury General Directorate resolution of 20 July 
2012, which establishes the role of the market maker in the Spanish public debt market, and its 
subsequent modifications, significant entry and exit barriers are imposed by the Treasury in 
order to secure and maintain the role of the market maker. To this end, the Treasury carries out 
monthly assessments on market maker activity in relation to debt security underwriting and 
participation in different types of operations in the primary and secondary market. In this respect, 
it can be seen how liquidity does not emerge on its own, nor does it flow out of a kind of 
economic state of nature, characterised by the absence of interventions or regulations. Instead, 
its development depends on specific institutional features and organizational activities 
(Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999: 358). 
Similarly, syndicate issuances are a relatively recent phenomenon in Spain. The first was 
held in 2002 and, according to data provided by the Treasury, as of 1 January 2015, the total 
number stood at just twenty-three.   
Table 1. Issue details 
Year ISIN 
Original issue 
Amount (EUR) 
Total issue 
Amount (EUR) 
Total price  
to public 
 
Price Yield 
Maturity 
Date 
Issue  
Date 
S&P 
rating  
2015 ES00000126Z1 9,000,000,000 17,742,830,000 8,953,020,000 99.478 1.656 27/01/2015 27/01/2015 BBB 
2014 ES00000124W3 10,000,000,000 21,186,212,000 9,963,800,000 99.638 3.845 30/04/2024 29/01/2014 BBB 
2013  ES00000123U9 7,000,000,000 18,282,208,000 6,999,370,000 99.991 5.403 31/01/2023 29/01/2013 BBB 
2011 ES00000123B9 6,000,000,000 24,042,834,000 5,953,980,000 99.233 5.604 30/04/2021 24/01/2011 BBB 
2010  ES00000122T3 6,000,000,000 18,670,120,000 5,989,980,000 99.833 4.874 31/10/2020 13/07/2010 BBB 
2009 ES00000121L2 7,000,000,000 21,368,777,000 6,972,140,000 99.602 4.6 30/07/2019 10/02/2009 BBB 
2008 ES00000121A5 5,000,000,000 19,581,410,000 4,960,700,000 99.214 4.1 30/07/2018 19/02/2008 BBB 
2007 ES00000120N0 4,000,000,000 13,605,380,000 3,986,200,000 99.655 4.9 30/07/2040 20/06/2007 BBB 
2006 ES00000120J8 5,000,000,000 21,829,147,000 4,977,300,000 99.546 3.8 31/01/2017 18/10/2006 BBB 
2005 ES0000012932 6,000,000,000 27,843,698,000 5,931,000,000 98.85 4.2 31/01/2037 17/01/2005 BBB 
2002  ES0000012783 5,000,000,000 21,349,582,000 4,972,900,000 99.458 5.556 30/07/2017 11/03/2002 BBB 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
Table 1 contains basic information about a sample of eleven issues, the most significant in terms 
of the monetary amount issued by year.  The average amount borrowed stands at 
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20,500,199,818 euro, and the original issue amount is 6,363,636,364, a difference of 
14,136,563,455 million euros, which is indicative of the investors’ interest in business 
opportunities offered by Spanish public debt securities. Likewise, the average price and annual 
coupon yield are 99.5 and 4.413, showing an increasing trend during the central years of the 
crisis in Spain between 2010 and 2013. 
4. Methods and data. 
The syndicate issuance data were obtained from information provided by the Thomson Reuters 
Security Data Corporation (SDC). This database contains information about all government bond 
issues, including the basic issuance details (price, yield, amount, identity of managers and co-
managers) and information about the investor holdings of syndicate bonds, the percentage of 
the total amount outstanding that is managed by the holder and the par amount, i.e., the 
reference bond value in the secondary market.  
In order to draw up the database, ISIN3 codes were used to identify the syndicated 
issuances between 2002 (the year of the first issue) and 2015. In those years when more than 
one issue was carried out, the one with the largest amount of public debt was selected.   
This database was then used for the social network analysis using Pajek (see de Nooy, 
Mrvar and Batageli, 2005). The choice of this software is due to the intention of carrying out a 
longitudinal media analysis that would provide us with the resulting status structure for each 
year, as well as the structure produced by the combination of the various years. In order to do 
this, a relational database was drawn up in order to obtain the one-mode network, which can be 
defined as follows:   
• The vertices, corresponding to the 31 banks that participated in the Spanish 
Government’s syndicated issuances between 2002 and 2015. Of these 31 institutions, 
only 25 were taken into consideration, as they participated in at least one of the issues 
included in our study.   
• The arcs, directed relations used to refer to the choice of co-managers by the leader 
manager group for each issue.    
• The edges, bi-directed relations used to refer to leader-leader relations.    
Likewise, a series of non-relational attributes were considered, such as the geographical and 
economic characteristics of the network vertices. As Nooy et al. (2005) pointed out, the attributes 
enhance our interpretation of the network structure and enable us to study subsections of the 
                                                            
3 An alphanumeric identification code for the set of issues. Mention must be made of the difficulties 
involved in accessing this information as the public debt values are not included in the corresponding 
issue leaflet.   
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network. For the purpose of our analysis we created a qualitative attribute relating to nationality 
and another relating to the ‘par amount’ in millions of dollars held by the various bond holders4.  
This attribute represents an innovation in the field of social science research as it provides a 
breakdown of the data in the form of an ordinal variable.  
5. Status analysis 
5.1. Degree status 
To convert the position of Banks in the network into a measure of status, we first analysed the 
structural prestige by measuring the indegree of each vertex k, represented by:  
where (ai,ak) =1 if and only if ak is the final arc node (ai,ak), i.e., the number of choices each 
vertex receives, either as a leader or co-leader. This measure essentially indicates co-manager 
prestige as it takes directed relations only into consideration, thereby indicating the frequency 
with which an actor is chosen to complete issue underwriting as a co-manager.  As Table 2 
below shows, Santander, together with Barclays, BBVA and Deutsche Bank, are included in the 
top 4% (see Cum Freq %) of the total list of banks that have 43 inputs or more. It must be 
stressed that although the size of each issue should be taken into consideration, we opted not to 
weight the data, as the larger the group of underwriters, the more complex it would be to reach 
agreements in the case of those banks acting as leaders, and therefore the choice of a specific 
bank as co-leader would be more significant.   
Table 2. Input degree listing in the Spanish syndicate bond market (Top 10) 
Input Degree Partition of N2 (31) 
Inputs        Freq Freq%    CumFreq  CumFreq%                                                   Representative
        47          1 3.2258         31 100.0000 Deutsche Bank 
        43           3 9.6774                30 96.7742 Santander, 
Barclays, BBVA 
        42 1 3.2258                 27 87.0968 Société Générale 
        39        1 3.2258         26 83.8710   Salomon 
Brother(Citigroup) 
        30              1 3.2258         25 80.6452   Crédit Agricole 
        29          1 3.2258         24 77.4194 Crédit Suisse 
        28                     1 3.2258         23 74.1935 Caixabank 
        27                  3 9.6774                22 70.9677 Goldman Sachs 
int., Caja Madrid, 
HSBC France 
        19                  1 3.2258         19 96.7742 Calyon 
        18                 1 3.2258         18 61.2903 JP Morgan 
Sum         31   100.0000  
 
                                                            
4 We have been unable to access the amount of debt underwritten by each actor in the issuance but we 
did have access to the amount of debt held by participating actors at a given time after trading the 
syndicated bond in the secondary market. 
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Likewise, the ten most prestigious banks in the Spanish government debt market are Goldman 
Sachs5, Caixabank, Credit Suisse, Credit Agricole, Citigroup, Société General, Barclays Bank, 
Santander, BBVA and Deutsche Bank (Table 2). 
 
 Secondly, influence was analysed by the outdegree of each vertex  k represented by: 
 where (ak,ai) =1 if and only if ak is the initial vertex of the arc (ak,ai), given that the 
number of times an actor participates in an issue as a leader, thereby selecting the co-leader 
group, is an indicator of influence.  As table 3 shows, Citigroup, Santander, and to a greater 
degree, Société Générale, Barclays and BBVA are the banks with the highest rate of 
participation as leaders, and therefore select their partners for syndicated debt underwriting. It 
must also be remembered that it is the State, via the Treasury Secretary’s Office, that selects 
the financial institutions included in the most active market makers that will lead each issue and 
therefore select the other partners.   
Table 3. Output Degree Listing in the Spanish syndicate bond market 
Outputs Freq      Freq%            CumFreq           CumFreq%       Representative 
105 1 3.2258         31 100.0000  BBVA 
101 1 3.2258         30 96.7742  Barclays Bank 
90 2 3.2258         29 93.5484  Société Générale 
83 1 3.2258         28 90.3226  Santander 
70 2 3.2258         27 87.0968  Salomon 
Brother(Citigroup) 
39 1 3.2258         26 83.8710  Calyon 
21 1 3.2258         25 80.6452  Goldman Sachs int. 
16 1 3.2258         24 77.4194  Crédit Agricole 
11 2 3.2258         23 74.1935  Caixabank 
10 1 3.2258         21 67.7419  BNP PARIBAS 
6 2 6.4516               20 64.5161  Deutsche 
5 1 3.2258         18 58.0645  JP Morgan 
0 17 54.8387       17 54.8387  Estado 
   Sum                                               31 100.0000 
 
It can therefore be claimed that 13% of the most influential financial institutions have 
selected 70 or more partners in the total number of Treasury issues, thereby holding a clearly 
dominant position over the remaining entities, with a total of 31 points separating them from the 
next financial institution.   
                                                            
5 In accordance with the indegree ranking, Goldman Sach holds eleventh position, HSBC twelfth and Caja 
Madrid thirteenth. 
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The centrality measures have been completed with the calculation of the Bonacich index 
(1987) which maintains that an individual’s status varies in accordance with that of the persons 
he/she is connected to:  
The proposal offered here is for a family of centrality measures c(α,β) generated by two 
parameters, α and β. Parameter β reflects the degree to which an individual's status is a function 
of the statuses of those to whom he or she is connected. If β is positive, c(α, β) is a conventional 
centrality measure in which each unit's status is a positive function of the statuses of those with 
which it is in contact (Bonacich 1987: 1170) 
The figure below illustrates the Bonacich index value, highlighting the five institutions with 
the highest values. These nodes coincide with those that have the highest output degree, as 
shown in Table 3.    
Figure 2. Market maker power network according to the Bonacich index calculated using Pajek.    
 
 
 
Drawing on Bother et al. (2010), the Bonacich index reflects the centrality of a network 
vertex determined by the centrality of those it is connected with; in other words,  not only the 
amount of deference received, but also the extent to which deference is directed from high 
status others. The Pajek command Hubs-Authorities applies this principle, allowing for the 
calculation of the eigenvector centrality (de Nooy et al. 2008: 153). 
For the purposes of this article, degree centrality measures were used to determine 
status correlation and the amount of debt acquired by each actor and their nationality, as they 
allow for a distinction to be drawn between the concept of prestige, namely the frequency with 
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which an actor is selected to form part of the underwriters group, and influence, which focuses 
on actor activity as leaders of the issuance underwriting.     
5.2.The evolution of the market marker network. 
Analysing a network overtime implies a series of theoretical and technical challenges. These 
include the fact that actors’ changing positions require a certain degree of stability in order to 
apply reasoning based on graphic visualisation (de Nooy, 2011). For the purpose of this paper, 
the method used consisted of generating an initial position for the actors based on the data 
provided. This led to the subsequent generation of further networks and the corresponding 
positions in each of the times stipulated t+1 (Gil-Mendieta et al. 1997; Nooy et al. 2005). The 
Frutcherman-Reingold algorithm (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991) was used to calculate the 
positions, including details of size, density, weighted indegree and outdegree node as elements 
for analysis.  
As for the evolution of the relations structure of the network of market makers that 
participated in syndicated issuances between 2002 and 2015, two clearly differentiated periods 
emerge.   
The first took place between 2002 and 2007 when the network of market makers that 
underwrote public debt was formed by a small number of leader and co-leader vertices. During 
this period it is not possible to identify a regular relation structure for participating actors, with the 
exception of BBVA, which took part in all of them, on most occasions acting as a leader. This is 
due mainly to the innovative nature of the syndicated procedure which was first introduced in 
2002.   
The second period, from 2008 onwards (see Figure 3), is characterised by a wider and 
denser structure of actors and relations in terms of dealings between managers or leaders and 
co-managers or co-leaders. This period saw the consolidation of a stable group of leaders made 
up of BBVA, Santander, Barclays, Citi Group and Société Générale which all participated on a 
regular basis, leading the issuance and selecting the group of co-managers. Naturally, and as 
will be seen later on, this core group of actors matches those identified as holding the highest 
and most influential positions of status in the general relational structure for the period in 
question.   
As for the co-manager group, the second period is also characterised by the emergence 
of a group of regular participants, namely Deutsche Bank, HSBC and, albeit to a lesser degree, 
Crédit Agricole. One of the most noteworthy features of this group, which was consolidated from 
2008 onwards, is that it does not include those actors previously defined as the most prestigious. 
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This is due to the fact that only those regularly chosen as co-leaders are taken into 
consideration, unlike the status positions defined in the case of prestige, which considers those 
actors chosen most often as either leaders or co-leaders.  Another key feature of this period is 
the specific behaviour of 7 financial institutions (Banesto, Banco Popular, CECA, Bankinter, 
Commerzbank, Natexis and RBC Europe Ltd.) which only participated as co-leaders in the 2007 
and 2008 issues, with the sole exception of Bankinter, which also appeared as a co-leader in 
2013. This can be attributed to the high degree of interest this type of issue holds for both the 
State and the banking industry in a context of sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Figure 3. The evolution of the market marker network6 
                                                            
6 Years 2003, 2004 and 2012 are not represented as there were no syndicated issuances during this 
period. The figure shows size, density and input-output centrality measures. 
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 Figure 3 shows that on considering the overall data, no clear distinction can be drawn 
between the position of institutions based on their function as leader or co-leader within the 
structure. As the structure varies from year to year, it can be seen how institutions with leader-
leader relations gradually position themselves at the centre of this structure, whilst those 
selected as co-leaders are positioned on the periphery.    
5. 3. Structural equivalent analysis.  
After analysing the individual status position of each actor in accordance with their node 
indegree and outdegree, the next stage consisted of analysing their network position for the 
entire period analysed by means of a structural equivalent analysis.    According to Wasserman 
and Faust (1997), the definition of structural equivalence specifies the precise formal conditions 
that must occur for actors to be equivalent. Structural equivalent actors have identical ties to and 
from identical actors in all R relations (Wasserman and Faust, 1997: 357; Lorrain and White, 
1971). Therefore, actors with similar patterns of ties are said to be relationally equivalent, to 
constitute an equivalent class, or to occupy equivalent positions in the network (Nooy et al., 
2005). 
In algebraic terms, structural equivalence (Batagel and Ferligoj 1992) can be defined as 
follows: where X is a set of n elements and R a simple relation defined on X and its 
corresponding matrix R=[rij]nXn, where: Rij=1 if xiRxj, and Rij=0 in any other case.  xi xj can be 
considered structurally equivalent if:    
1. rij=rji 
2. rii=rjj 
3. ∀k ≠i,j: rik=rjk 
4. ∀k ≠i,j: rki=rkj 
This definition can also be applied to the case where rij are real numbers. This means that 
the concept of structural equivalence is also applicable to non-symmetric and valued matrices.   
In order to analyse the structurally equivalent position, a statistical technique known as 
‘hierarchical clustering’ was used.  This technique is effective in representing positions in social 
network data (Wasserman and Faust, 1998). Its main advantage lies in the fact that it solves the 
need for transparent classification and structuring, and in general, for the creation of individual 
typologies based on their position within a specific relational network.   The procedure is explicit 
and the interpretation is clear. However, this technique places too much emphasis on the 
researcher’s interpretation when choosing the dissimilarity measure and the number of clusters 
for the final solution. Indeed, the hierarchical clustering technique is accompanied by the use of 
the blockmodelling technique in order to confirm the results obtained, as both are intended to 
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identify positions of structural equivalence. As  Dorian et al. state, “Blockmodelling provides a 
method and rationale for distilling the clusters of actors that share as much, as possible, 
common patterns of ties within and between the clusters” (2005). 
The number of blocks was determined in accordance with the results of the hierarchical 
clusters analysis. Pajek was used to calculate the hierarchical clusters and blocks based on 
structural equivalence.   
Following this framework, the analysis was organised as follows:    
1) Choice of proximity, similarity or dissimilarity measure   
As stated previously, we have attempted to identify structural equivalent positions determined by 
the dynamics of the partner choice process, and therefore we consider that who selected who, 
the direction of the relation, and the role played by each actor in each issuance in the period 
under study are vital elements that must be taken into account. Furthermore, it must also be 
remembered that the institutions act on occasions as leaders and on others as co-leaders.  In 
this sense, and  in order to differentiate between leader-leader and leader-co-leader relations, 
value 1 directed relations were drawn up in order to refer to leader – co-leader relations, and 
value 2 bi-directed relations to refer to leader-leader relations.  
Given that the leader-leader relations were attributed a value of 2, and leader – co-leader 
relations a value of 1, we opted to apply a distance measure that would take into consideration 
directed relations and the multiple ties between the financial institutions, such as the Euclidean 
distance (D5) between vertices (u,v) (see Sneath and Sokal, 1973):  
𝑑!(u, v) = ( 𝑞!" − 𝑞!" ! + 2 𝑞!" − 𝑞!" !+ 𝑞!! − 𝑞!! ! + 𝑞!" − 𝑞!" !)!!!!!  !!,!  
A key factor for consideration is that based on the adjacency matrix Q, the program 
calculates the dissimilarity measure for the set of years analysed, not for each separate year. 
The chosen measure considers both the vertex neighbourhoods and the line values.   
In line with the theoretical and methodological approach described in this paper, which 
distinguishes clearly between two relational models represented by values 1 and 2, D5 is the 
appropriate measure to estimate the structurally equivalent positions of status.   
As discussed above, the relationship between market structure and status is derived from 
the relational nature of this concept whereby status is understood as an actor position within a 
network of relationships that form a market structure.  
2) Choice of classification method 
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The Ward descendant hierarchical clustering method was used, the default option in the 
Pajek program. With this method, each phase combines two elements that represent the 
minimum loss of inertia; in other words, two groups are joined in an attempt to minimise the 
variance within each group (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984).   
3) Classification of the financial institutions into groups and calculation of the number of 
groups   
By applying the D5 dissimilarity measure based on the Euclidean distance, we obtained a 
solution of three clusters that clearly indicate structurally different positions in the public debt 
market based on the dual definition of status and the capacity for influence and prestige, as 
explained below.   
Table 4. Cluster composition 
Cluster 1 ’Dominant market 
members’ 
Cluster  2 ’Most prestigious co-
managers’ 
Cluster  3 ’Occasional co-leaders 
market members’ 
Sub-tree of  100022 [20.08] (5) Subtree of  100021 [18.32] (10) Subtree of  100019 [13.37] (10) 
(code 6) BBVA (code 9) Caixabank (code 1) Banesto 
(code 16) Barclays Bank (code 19) HSBC France (code 3) Popular 
(code 14) Société General (code 5) Credit Agricole (code 7) CECA 
(code 2 ) Santander (code 20) Deutsche Bank (code 17) Commerzbank 
(code 11) Salomon Brother 
(Citigroup) 
(code 23) BNP PARIBAS (code 22) Natexis 
 (code 25) Royal Bank of  
Scotland, PLC 
(code 4) Bankinter 
 (code 8) Caja Madrid (code 10) JP Morgan 
 (code 18) Credit Suisse (code 12) Dresdner Bank 
 (code 21) Goldman Sachs int. (code 13) Morgan Stanley 
 (code 24) Calyon (code 15) Bank of America 
 
Firstly, and as shown in Table 4, we obtained a structurally equivalent group in terms of 
leadership positions in the public debt market. This group is made up of those institutions with a 
high degree of participation in syndicated issuances, with an average of 8 participations as 
leader per institutions, notably   BBVA and Barclays, and mainly as leaders of said issues. The 
group is therefore highly influential as its members are responsible for organising the issue and 
selecting the co-leaders. 
The second group comprises institutions with a high degree of participation in the public 
debt market, albeit somewhat lower than the previous group, as well as a high degree of 
participations as issue co-leaders. This group is extremely uniform, although Deutsche Bank 
stands out as the most frequently selected partner and therefore the most prestigious. Also 
worthy of note is the close equivalence between the positions of Caixa Bank and HSBC France 
on the one hand, and Credit Suisse and Caja Madrid on the other, all with an average 
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participation rate of 5 issues. These institutions rank immediately behind Deutsche Bank in 
terms of market prestige. They are followed by the remaining institutions with a lower level of 
participation.  
Finally, Table 4 shows a third group, characterised by their low level of participation in the 
auctions and particularly in their role as co-leaders.   
The process whereby the clusters are formed is shown in Table 5, with the application of 
the D5 similarity measure in which the arc value is taken into consideration, as mentioned 
before. The table includes the dissimilarity value for each cluster analysis solution. When 
considering the two clusters, each formed by 10 nodes, the dissimilarity value is higher (55.58) 
than the value of each separate cluster (18.32 and 13.37), which indicates that there are clear 
differences between the two clusters. When all three clusters are considered together, the 
dissimilarity value is almost five times higher (258.61), revealing a high degree of intra-group 
homogeneity and heterogeneity between the three clusters.   
Table 5. Hierarchical Clustering Solutions 
Total number of 
resulting clusters 
Cluster (C) Dissimilarity value Number of actors 
included in cluster 
3 Clusters C. 1 18.32 10 
C. 2 13.37 10 
C. 3 20.08 5 
2 Clusters C.1 55.58 20 
C. 2 20.08 5 
1 Cluster C1 258.61 25 
 
The Frutcherman and Reingold (1991) algorithm was used to determine the structure of 
the network in which the actors’ position is defined by their structural equivalence and theoretical 
distance. Their position in the Euclidean plane was based on their physical location, with 
structurally equivalent actors occupying positions of proximity, whilst their position in terms of 
other groups of actors was determined in accordance with their theoretical distance.   
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Figure 4. Structural Equivalence positions in syndicate bond issuance  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows a group that is clearly defined by the market-dominant institutions that 
belong to cluster 1 (in light grey); followed almost immediately by a second group made up 
essentially of relation recipients, including the 10 institutions that constitute the second cluster 
(in grey); and a third peripheral group that includes the remaining institutions (in black ). In order 
to provide a graphic representation of the node relevance in the network, the valued centrality 
was calculated: namely the sum of the tie values, which is also a status indicator. This value was 
used to calculate the node diameter, as shown in the graph.  
 
5.4. Correlation analysis of status scores and amount and nationality partition 
After examining the relational patterns between the financial institutions by means of an analysis 
of prestige and influence, the next stage was to analyse the correspondence between indegree 
and outdegree ranking, as status position indicators and their correlation with 1) a variable that 
defines participants’ identity, such as the banks’ nationality and 2) the debt amount in millions of 
dollars held by the various institutions for each issue over a specific period of time.  
!
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Regarding the first point, the aim was to observe the extent to which essentially 
advantageous status positions in the public debt market are related to the participants’ 
nationality, creating a stratification of the market determined by the geographical origin of the 
participating institutions. In this sense, we have calculated Cramer’s V coefficient, derived from 
Pearson’s chi-squared test.    
Let a sample of size n of the simulteneouly distributed variables  A y B for i = 1, …, r; 
j=1,…, k; be given by the frequencies nij = number of times the values  (Ai, Bj) were observed. 
Cramer’s V is computed by taking the squared root of Pearson´s chi-squared (x2) divided by the 
sample size and the minimun dimension minus 1:  
 
Regarding the second point, our objective was to establish the degree of association 
between structural market status positions and the ownership of bonds issued in this market by 
the various financial institutions.  The amount of debt has been grouped together in a total of 
seven intervals in order to transform the original vector variable into a new ordinal variable, using 
the command partition which, according to Pajek software, enables us to simplify the Spearman 
rank-order correlation, providing a suitable association measure for ordinal variables of the type 
we are concerned with here.  Consequently, considering two size n samples, ranks xi y yi based 
on values Xi, Yi were calculated first. The coefficient is calculated as: , 
where 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 is the difference between ranks. 
Table 6.  Spearman Correlation7. 
Partitions Amount Partition 
and Indegree 
ranking Partition of 
N2 (31) 
Amount Partition 
and Output 
Degree ranking 
Partition of N2 
(31) 
Amount Partition 
and All Degree 
Partition of N2 
(31) 
Nationality and All 
Degree Partition of 
N2 (31) 
 
Spearman Rank 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.673 0.663 0.680  
 
Cramer’s V     Chi=130.42962963 
V Cramer =0.725 
 
                                                            
7 A table of 95% critical values was used for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. The results showed 
that the critical value for an n=31 sample is 0.368 and the highest values are  0.673, 0.663 and 0.680. 
These are significant, unlike the value of the Cramer’s V coefficient, which at 0.0958 is not significant. 
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As shown in Table 6, there is a strong and positive correlation between input and output 
degree ranking, understood as an indicator of status, and the amount of bonds held by the 
different actors in millions of euros. This strong association indicates that these investors are the 
most powerful and influential, and hold a greater number of bonds in their own portfolios, instead 
of distributing them among their clients. This is because the price and interest terms and 
conditions of syndicated issuances are more beneficial for investors than those obtained by the 
standard auction procedure, and therefore act as an incentive for those institutions that regularly 
play an active role in the public debt market. Therefore, when placing bonds acquired during the 
issue to third parties, priority is given to requests for their own portfolio, even when this is not in 
line with the objectives of this type of issue mechanisms, whose function, as discussed earlier, is 
the international dissemination and promotion of public debt bonds.   
Secondly there is a statistically non-significant association between nationality and status 
operationalised as input, output and all degree. It is not possible to talk about market 
segmentation in terms of nationality, which is significant considering that it is one of the most 
important market mechanisms in providing the Government with access to credit and liquidity. 
The irrelevance of nationality in shaping status positions would appear to confirm the strategic 
importance of foreign investors on government debt markets for state governments, to the 
detriment of the national elite.   
Contrary to expectations of economic and financial research, the results confirm the 
existence of a social structure for the government debt market, with demonstrable effects on the 
concentration of bonds held by a limited number of financial institutions.  The outcomes of this 
social structuration of the market in status positions illustrates the Matthew Effect (1968) 
whereby recognition is transformed into unequal access to economic resources. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the micro social structure of Spain’s government debt market, 
considering essentially the positions of status held by the various financial institutions included in 
the group of market makers and that took part in the syndicated issuances held between 2002 
and 2015.    
The syndicated issuance model analysed here reveals the institutional micro-structure 
whereby the State attempts to cut the transaction costs associated with its finance model for 
government debt markets. Access to credit is guaranteed by the creation of a network of 
financial institutions responsible for organising the auction and supposedly distributing the 
securities on international markets  
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The research suggests that the mechanism used by states to finance their deficit is not a 
narrow ’economic’ phenomenon, but rather a holistic political and social one (Baker, 1984; 
Hager, 2015).  The case analysed exemplifies the debt consolidation concept posited by Streeck 
(2015) in order to describe the profound modifications to major democratic institutions, stemming 
from the subjection of government policies to a series of institutional measures and 
arrangements designed to secure creditors’ ongoing confidence in the solvency of sovereign 
states and their access to credit under sustainable conditions (see Massó 2016). In an incentive-
based institutional pattern, this takes the form of a market arrangement for the acquisition and 
dissemination of government debt, guaranteeing a two-fold advantage for financial institutions in 
exchange for a considerable influx of cash for the state, by securing the totality of the issue for 
participating banks. This twofold advantage comes firstly from the commissions received for 
taking part in this type of issue, and secondly, from the fact that  price and interest rates of 
syndicated issuances are more profitable than those obtained by the standard auction 
procedure.  
The effect of debt concentration on a limited set of domestic and foreign financial 
institutions is significant in the shaping of a new financial aristocracy. This must be seen within 
the context of a financialisation process (van der Zwan, 2014) in which the state and 
supranational organisations have played an active role in the institutional design of the global 
financial order. Drawing on Streeck (2015), the recent sovereign debt crisis experienced in 
southern European countries and the model of fiscal austerity aimed at boosting market 
confidence in the sustainability of the countries involved, reflects the shift from the   activist-
interventionist state of post-war democratic capitalism towards a lean state that is receptive to 
market pressures. 
 The research shows that the State plays a crucial role in selecting positions of influence 
in the market. It selects the participating financial institutions in accordance with financial criteria, 
as well as their trade capacity or debt market potential, positioning them as leaders for a specific 
issuance. Over time, the interaction of these organisations in selecting their underwriting 
partners shapes a relational framework for status positions that we have defined as a social 
market structure.   
In line with Podolny (1993), the status positions of the market members affect the 
additional advantages they enjoy in the market. These advantages reproduce the so-called 
Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968) whereby actors with a higher status obtain greater recognition 
and greater rewards that allow them to consolidate their advantage. 
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This research shows that the market maker network is not rooted in national business 
communities. Instead, it confirms the transnational embeddedness of the Spanish government 
debt market through the concentration of debt securities in a complex and national 
heterogeneous structure. This conclusion converges with recent research on Spanish 
interlocking directorates (De Andrés, 2014; Cárdenas, 2012; Sicilia & Sallan, 2008). 
Finally, the natural progression of this study would be to examine the role played by 
market regulations in the configuration of status positions. Elements such as entry and exit 
barriers and fiscal policy are key institutional mechanisms that may affect the social organization 
of the market. This provides major insights into the role of the State as a status producer. 
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